

# **From Incident to Insight: Unpacking Lessons for a Safer Maritime Industry**


## **The EMSA approach**


International Safety@Sea Week 2025

Singapore, 15 July 2025


Santiago Encabo  
Head of Unit / Unit 2.1 Safety & Security








# What's happening at sea during this event?



9



29



32



9



[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Double\\_herm\\_Chiamonti\\_Inv1395.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Double_herm_Chiamonti_Inv1395.jpg)

# What do they have in common?



Titanic, 12 Jan 1912



SS Torrey Canyon, 18 Mar 1967

Erika, 12 Dec 1999



Prestige, 13 Nov 2002



✓ Prevent and avoid to happen again



✓ Understand



✓ Analyse and conclude



✓ Learn lessons and make recommendations



✓ Act, change and improve



✓ No blame





**>42,300**  
OCCURRENCES



**3%**

Very serious

**17%**

Marine incidents


**81%**

Other marine casualties



**>1,600**


INVESTIGATIONS




# Some of our products





<https://www.emsa.europa.eu/accident-investigation-publications.html>



# Some of our products



# EMCIP IN ACTION - CARGOSAFE



## Formal Safety Assessment Process



## CARGOSAFE IDENTIFIED 17 Cost-Effective Measures:

- 2 for Prevention
- 6 for Detection
- 6 for Fire-fighting
- 3 for Containment

**These measures are being discussed at IMO for SOLAS amendments**

**New risks – how to approach them without statistics?**

**Risk assessment – harmonisation**

**Reliability analysis – need to develop databases**

# Risk Based Assessment Tool – RBAT for MASS





**Risk Based Assessment Tool – RBAT is included  
in the IMO Interim Guidelines for MASS**



# Alternative fuels uptake – World Fleet

## World fleet – all ship types


In operation



On order for delivery until 2033



## Carriage of vehicles using Alternative Fuels/Batteries



## AFVs Guidance

May 2022


## Batteries for ship's services



## BESS Safety Guidance

Nov. 2023


## Shore-Side Electricity



## SSE Guidance

for Port Authorities  
and Administrations

June 2022



Toxic  
20 ppm (8h) EU-EOL  
IDLH 300 ppm




Corrosive to metals  
and skin



Flammability limit  
15-28%  
**Narrow**  
Medium  
concentration

Contracted to **ABS Hellenic  
SM LLC, Fundacion  
Valenciaport and NTUA**

Start date: 18/09/2023 -  
End date: Q4 2025



Contracted to **DNV AS**

Start date: 19/09/2023 -  
End date: Q4 2024



Flammability limit  
4-77%  
**Extremely wide**  
Low concentration



Liquefied gas -  
cryogenic  
Compressed at 350-  
700 bar  
Asphyxiant



BLEVE  
Rapid phase  
transition  
High flame velocity  
(>7x more than LNG)

Contracted to **DNV AS**

Start date: 6/05/2024 -  
End date: Q1 2026

# **ALTERNATIVE FUELS**

## **HYDROGEN EXAMPLE**



## PART I – Hydrogen Properties, Regulations and Accidents Review


### Some conclusions:

- Technical measures more effective for mitigation and control than operational measures
- ISO 2015 and NASA 1997 - Regulators are advised to assume an ignition source is present even when acceptable standards for certified electrical equipment are followed
- Hydrogen leakages should be prevented from reaching areas where combustion could occur


# Hydrogen properties, regulations and accidents overview

HIAD 2.0 Database(575 accidents)

[EUROPA - MINERVA Home Page - European Commission - HIADPT](#)



**Note:** Accidents recorded since the 1960s - 88 accidents in the past 10 years, 41 in the past 5 years



## PART II – Reliability analysis

### Some conclusions:

- Heat exchangers, compressors, pumps and filters have higher leak rates compared to other components
- Traditional gas detectors have long response time - likely too long to prevent a critical gas cloud from occurring on open deck
- Strategically mounted excess flow valves and restrictive orifices can be used to reduce leak rates, but have limitations
- Lack of hydrogen-specific failure data and uncertainties wrt suitability for ship applications result in a high degree of uncertainty in leak frequency analysis in QRAs for hydrogen fuel system installations

- High likelihood of leakages in fuel systems (Reliability analysis)
- Traditional gas detectors have long response time (Reliability analysis)
  - likely too long to prevent a critical gas cloud from occurring on open deck
- Ignition should be assumed (NASA, ISO)

### **Mitigating actions:**

#### **Complete inerted secondary enclosures for hydrogen fuel piping systems**

- Enables rapid leakage detection
- Enables leaked hydrogen to be led to a safe area (e.g. vent mast)
- Inerting prevents ignition

Challenging for portable tanks, which depends on non-permanent connections to ship systems

## **ALTERNATIVE FUEL VEHICLES**

### **FOCUS ON FIRE SAFETY**

# ALTERNATIVE FUEL VEHICLES

**Felicity Ace – 2022**



**MV Fremantle Highway - 2023**



**Grande Costa D'Avorio – 2023**



**MV Delphine – 2025**



**Morning Midas - 2025**



**Grande Brasile - 2025**





- **Separated in three parts:**
  - General;
  - Ropax;
  - Ro-ro cargo and vehicle carriers;
  - + Annexes

EMSA is starting a new safety assessment study addressing

### **Alternative Fuels Vehicles (AFVs) fire safety on-board of ships**

The study includes an extensive experimental campaign and builds on previous studies such as FIRESAFE I and II and LASHFIRE project



**Thank you!**

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